We present a novel study of reliable broadcast in interdependent networks, in which the failures in one network may cascade to another network. In particular, we focus on the interdependency between a communication network and a power grid network, where the power grid depends on the communication network for control and the communication network depends on the grid for power.
, 2011 Southwest blackout [4] , and 2012 Hurricane Sandy [5, 6] are all examples of such interdependency. For instance, during the 2003 U.S. Northeastern power outage, 3,175 communication networks suffered from abnormal connectivity outage [3] .
With the development of the Internet of Things (IoT) technologies, communication network plays an increasingly important role in today's infrastructure networks. Indeed, although it has been shown to greatly increase the resilience of existing infrastructures, failures or cyber attacks may cause severe impact to all the infrastructures. However, despite the significance of resilience in interdependent cyber infrastructures, to the best of our knowledge, none of the previous work has formalized the problem of cyber interdependencies and studied resilient solutions to handle such failures.
We study reliable broadcast in a multihop communication network c-network and a power grid network p-network, which are mutually dependent. The cnetwork is composed of a set of c-nodes (e.g., routers, sensors, etc.) connected by communication links and the p-network is composed of a set of p-nodes (e.g., power substations) connected by power lines. In order for the nodes to operate, a c-node must receive power from at least one p-node and a p-node must receive control signals from at least one c-node. We model the interdependency using graphs. As illustrated in Figure 1 , when c 2 fails, it cannot provide control signals to p 1 and p 3 . Node p 1 can still operate since c 1 has an edge to it. However, communication network, a c-node sends a message through certain paths to some c-nodes. C-nodes are subject to crash failures, which can be reliably detected by other c-nodes. In comparison, correct nodes faithfully follow the protocols, where correct node is a commonly used term in distributed systems and networks [7, 8, 9, 10, 11] . Our goal is to design a solution that guarantees best effort broadcast despite the presence of crashing c-nodes, where all the correct nodes deliver the messages if the sender is correct. In addition, our work can be easily extended to handle the failures of p-nodes which are not caused directly by any c-node failures.
We illustrate the idea of using soft links to handle cascading failures, which are backup links that are activated to handle the failures of primary communication links. The idea of soft links is not new. Specifically, in an independent c-network, in order to handle the failure of a neighbor, a node c i only needs to build a soft link to the neighbor of its neighbor prior to the failure so that messages can still be sent along the path when the failure occurs. However, in interdependent networks, since failures occur in a widespread cascading fashion, it is possible that the neighbor of c i s neighbor also fails. A straightforward solution is to build multiple soft links to different nodes in each path to handle such a problem. However, it is extremely challenging to determine how many Due to the use of the above approach, best effort broadcast is achieved with the following benefits. First, nodes only need to maintain minimum information in order to analyze the failures. Indeed, since we use a distributed failure analysis algorithm, nodes do not need to maintain the information of the whole network. Second, the information of cascading failures is collected in a fully distributed manner. Last but not least, our algorithm provides decision makers a reference of highly effective usage of soft links to handle failures prior to their occurrence. In order to handle one c-node failure, each c-node maintains only one soft link although a set of consecutive c-nodes may fail as a cascading effect. This guarantees that messages can be reliably broadcast to every correct c-node in the communication network. In order to fully assess the distributed algorithm, we also propose a centralized algorithm where nodes all rely on a cen-tralized computing agent to analyze cascading failures. Our evaluation results show that our distributed algorithm achieves low packet drop rate and generates little overhead to the normal network traffic. The trade-off is a slightly longer delay in handling failures.
Our paper makes the following contributions:
We present the first reliable broadcast model in the interdependent networks.
We study best effort broadcast in the presence of crash failures in the communication network, which may cause cascading failures in both power grid network and communication network.
We present a fully distributed algorithm for the nodes to analyze the cascading failures. Each node maintains minimum information of the interdependent networks.
We illustrate the usage of soft links in addition to the primary links in the communication network to achieve best effort broadcast. In order to handle one failure, each c-node only maintains one soft link although multiple cascading failures may occur due to a single failure.
Our evaluation results show that our algorithm achieves low packet drop rate and generates little overhead to the normal network traffic. The trade-off is a slightly longer delay in handling failures.
Related Work
Modeling interdependencies between critical infrastructure networks is challenging due to a wide range of dimensions such as the types of coupling and the types of failures [12, 13] . Previous studies of interdependent network systems focus mainly on the analysis of vulnerabilities or robustness of the CIs [14, 15, 16, 17, 18] . A few mathematical frameworks [19, 20, 21] and interdependency models [22, 23, 24] have been proposed to support vulnerability analysis. The idea is to mainly predict the catastrophic consequences under extreme events given that live monitoring of the infrastructures could be provided [25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30] .
A number of works study the interdependency between communication network and power grid, most of which focus on finding the vulnerabilities of existing network [22] or the design of a robust topology [23] . In comparison, we study a resilient solution that handles the failures in communication network in the interdependency model. A shorter version of our paper has appeared previously at ICDCN 2017 [31] .
Reliable broadcast [7] , such as reliable broadcast and uniform broadcast, has been widely studied in independent networks. In terms of failures, previous works study crash failures [8, 9] and Byzantine (arbitrary) failures [7, 10] in both highly connected networks [8, 32, 33, 34] and loosely connected networks [35, 11, 36] . We study best effort broadcast, where all the correct nodes deliver the message if the sender is correct in interdependent networks.
Reliable broadcast of multipath message forwarding has also been studied in publish/subscribe systems [37, 38] . The use of soft links has been studied to handle failures during message forwarding [37] . Each node maintains several soft links prior to the failures that can be activated in the presence of failures.
We use similar idea of soft links to handle failures.
Failure detectors were proposed previously to detect faulty behaviors in distributed systems and networks [39, 40] . Chandra and Toueg [39] introduced the notion of unreliable failures detectors, where each failure detector outputs the identity of processes suspected to have crashed and nodes can rely on it for message transmission. We also use failure detectors for c-nodes to detect crashing c-nodes in their routing tables.
Interdependency Model
We study the interdependency between two networks: the power grid network p-network and the communication network c-network. The p-network consists of a set of n p-nodes p 1 , p 2 , · · · , p n (e.g. substations). The c-network consists of a set of m c-nodes c 1 , c 2 , · · · , c m (e.g., routers, sensors, etc.). The p-nodes are connected with power lines and the c-nodes are connected with communication links. Each c-node constantly receives power from the p-nodes and every p-node constantly receives control signals from the c-nodes. We follow a model similar with the one used in previous work [23, 22, 24] , where a p-node operates if it receives control signals from at least one c-node and a c-node operates if it receives power from at least one p-node. We assume c-nodes do not have backup battery, i.e., a c-node immediately fails if it does not receive power from any p-nodes. In addition, we assume that power substations are connected to power generators, i.e., each power substation is connected to a generator that is sufficient for receiving power and we ignore the amount of power supply or demand. In other words, p-nodes can only fail when there are no incoming control signals.
Notation
Meaning The interdependency between the networks can be represented in a graph Figure 1 . We use several notations to represent the network, as shown in Table 1 , and we use edges and links interchangeably. V = V c ∪ V p is the set of all the nodes and E = E c ∪ E p ∪ E cp ∪ E pc is the set of all the edges. The network is composed of both directional and bidirectional edges to distinguish different features of independent/single network and interdependent networks. Outgoing interdependent network degree (abbreviated as oin degree) and incoming interdependent network degree (abbreviated as iin degree) represent the degree regarding the number of interdependency edges.
We also use the term degree by default to refer to the number of edges of a node in an independent network. Without loss of generality, we call two c-nodes We now introduce several notions and define cascading failures. is a set of consecutive failures if, ∀i ∈ {1, · · · , n − 1}, c i fails, n ≥ 2, and seq is a path. We assume each c-node has a perfect failure detector, which provides information about certain c-nodes being crashed or not and it satisfies the following properties.
Strong Completeness. Eventually, every c-node that crashes is permanently detected by every correct c-node.
Strong Accuracy. If a c-node c is detected by any c-node, then c has crashed.
The failure detector can be realized using a timeout mechanism. Specifically, in order for a c-node c 1 to detect the correctness of c-node c 2 , it sends a heartbeat message and starts a timer. If c 1 has not received a reply message before the timer expires, c 2 is suspected to be faulty. Although the failure detector abstraction relaxes the timing assumption on nodes and links [7] , performance can be guaranteed under partial synchrony [41] : synchrony holds only after some unknown global stabilization time, but the bounds on communication and
processing delays are themselves unknown to the nodes.
We consider the best effort reliable broadcast problem in c-network under the above interdependency model, where all the correct nodes deliver the messages if the sender is correct. It satisfies the following properties. We provide a centralized algorithm and a fully distributed algorithm to build soft links to guarantee best effort broadcast in interdependent networks. The design of using soft links can also be considered as a reference of building a robust topology in the interdependent network settings. Such an algorithm can be abstracted away to work in any interdependent networks with similar properties. However, there are several practical problems regarding building soft links. Indeed, in a wireless network, it is feasible to build soft links as backup links and activate them later. In a sensor network, we must also make sure that two nodes are within certain distance so as to make a connection between them. In addition, in a wired network where we consider only routers, we have to actually pre-build the physical links between routers to maintain the soft links. We strengthen that our proposed algorithm can be used as a reference to build a best effort broadcast protocol where if sender is correct and all the soft links can be correctly built or maintained, all the correct receivers will receive the same messages by the sender. Our solution can also be employed with other techniques such as backup routes so as to handle failures.
Best Effort Broadcast in Interdependent Networks
In this section, we first introduce the preliminaries and then present our best effort broadcast algorithm. Specifically, in addition to primary links, we also propose to use soft links, which are the information of inactive links to handle the failures of primary links. Through the activation of soft links, new connections are built between correct c-nodes so that messages can be reliably delivered in the presence of failures.
Our soft link technique is used to guarantee best effort reliable message transmission through new communication links so that all the correct destination nodes receive and deliver the same message. In order to correctly build soft links, we employ two sub-algorithms: a cascading failure information collec- 
We assume that all the c-nodes communicate according to the routing tables as in a regular communication network and we refer to the tables as regular routing tables. In other words, for each c-node c i and a specific destination c j , if c i wants to send a message to c j , c i looks up its routing table and verifies that c j is reachable, finds a neighbor c k , and sends the message to c k .
In addition to the regular routing tables for message transmission in a regular communication network, each c-node also maintains a p-link table P T , the c-link tables for all the p-nodes in P T , denoted by {CT }, and all the c-groups that it is a member of, denoted by {CG}. For instance, as shown in Figure 2 , c-node for both p 1 and p 3 , and a c-group, which only has c 2 in it. All the tables can be obtained heuristically during initial network setup. We ignore the details in this paper since it is not the main focus of our work.
It is straightforward to see that the number of entries in a p-link table is at most l 1 and the number of entries in a c-link table is at most l 2 , according to the notations in Table 1 . Also, a c-node has at most l 1 c-groups and the number of c-nodes in each c-group is at most l 3 . Therefore, in addition to the routing information in an independent communication network, the extra storage space
, where l 1 is the size its p-link table, l 1 l 2 is the size of c-link tables for the p-nodes, and l 1 l 3 is the size of all the c-groups.
In the worst case, l 1 can be as large as n and l 2 and l 3 can be as large as m.
Therefore, the storage space complexity is limited by O(mn). When a neighbor of c j receives this message, it returns the result to c i . Also notice that if c j is not reachable by c i , c i cannot detect the failures.
Best Effort Broadcast Algorithm
Our best effort broadcast algorithm proceeds as follows. We use a fully distributed f-information collection algorithm (as we will introduce in details in In the normal case when there are no failures, c-nodes use their regular routing tables for message transmission. If a c-node c i detects the failure of its subsequent node c j through the failure detector and it has a pending message to c j , it first diagnoses the situation using the pre-collected f-information from c j . If the destination node c l will also fail, c i simply stops broadcasting the message since c l will also be faulty. Otherwise, c i activates the corresponding soft link, builds the connection, and sends messages to the activated soft link.
For long term robustness, it is important for nodes to monitor the correctness of the c-nodes in the routing tables to maintain the most up-to-date topology. As we will describe in details in Section 4.4, link management is used to update the tables. The soft links will be updated through another round of f-information collection.
Discussion. In a mesh topology, it is possible that there are alternative paths to the destination, which we can use to guarantee message delivery. However, it is also possible that failures cascade to the alternative paths. Therefore, the use of soft links is very effective in guaranteeing that all the correct nodes deliver the message. Also note that if some correct nodes are not initially connected, e.g., under the scenario of network partition, the technique of using soft links is not effective in guaranteeing best effort broadcast. When the root node learns the set of cascading failures when it fails, it sends the f-information to all its neighbors.
F-information Collection
In the f-information collection algorithm, each c-node only keeps partial information about the cascading failures, i.e., it receives the f collect from a cnode, computes the subsequent failures, and sends to the corresponding c-nodes that will fail subsequently and waits for f return messages. We use a watchlist() scheme for the nodes to collect the information during such a process. This can be represented as a logical Depth First Search (DFS) tree, as shown in Figure 6 , where the arrows between nodes represent the message flow and the links between parent and its child nodes may not be real communication links.
Instead, the logical tree just demonstrates the sequence of message transmission during f-information collection. The root of the tree is the root node c ini that starts the f-information collection process, which is included in both f collect and f return messages. When a node c i receives an f collect message, it keeps track of the previous node who sent the f collect message (the parent in the tree, which may or may not be the root node, as shown in ln 19) and watches all the c-nodes that will fail after it fails, i.e., the child nodes in the tree. It sends the f collect to one node in its watchlist() at a time and waits for the f return messages. When c i receives an f return message, it removes the node from watchlist() , as shown in ln 34, and merges X to X, as shown in ln 35.
If there are still nodes in its watchlist(), c i continues to send f collect message until it receives f return from all of them. When watchlist() becomes empty, c i sends an f return message to its previous node prev(c ini ). This mechanism is necessary for each node to collect all the cascading failures since each node only carries partial information. nor c 6 will consider the failure of p 9 and therefore some failures may be ignored during this process. In addition, the sequence of sending messages to nodes in the watchlist() does not affect the result since eventually all the nodes will be visited.
Additionally, it is possible that a node in the watchlist() is not reachable.
In this case, the c-node just skips the node and sends the message to next node in the watchlist().
The reason is that we analyze the failures prior to their occurrence. For instance, if a node c 1 is not reachable by c 2 , c 1 must not be reachable by the root node c 3 due to the fact that c 2 is reachable by c 3 .
Therefore, if some nodes are not reachable prior to the failures, the use of soft links is not effective and it is out of scope of this paper.
Link Management
In order for c-nodes to maintain the routing tables that represent the most up-to-date topology, each c-node c i monitors the correctness of several c-nodes in addition to its direct neighbors. These c-nodes include the c-nodes in the c-link tables and c-nodes in all the c-groups of c i . The algorithm is shown in Figure 7 , where {CG}.c j denotes all the c-groups that c j is a member of, cg.p The key idea for the failure detection is that if a c-node fails, we must remove the interdependency edges and update the tables at all the applicable c-nodes. When the outgoing interdependency edges of a c-node are removed, the corresponding number in the p-link table must be updated, i.e., the iin degree of the p-node in all the applicable p-link tables must be decreased by one. Therefore, we introduce the idea of c-groups and we now introduce the maintenance of c-groups using a leader-based scheme.
In each c-group, a leader is elected and agreed by all the c-nodes. Initially, there is a default leader in each group. The leader monitors the correctness of all the c-nodes in the same group. When it detects the failure of some c-node 
Correctness
We show the correctness of our best effort broadcast algorithm in the fol- Proof. The no creation property is straightforward. Since we assume nodes can only fail by crashing, each message, if received by some c-node, must be generated by the sender, i.e., no creation property is true.
We now show the validity property in two steps. We first show that if soft links are correctly maintained and there are no consecutive failures, messages are delivered to all the correct receivers. Then we show that if there are no new failures during f-information collection and link management, soft links can be correctly maintained. Based on these, the validity property can be proved.
We assume that there are no consecutive root failures. Therefore, one soft link for each node, if correctly maintained, is sufficient to guarantee that messages are reliably delivered to the next correct c-node. For each path, by induction, messages can always be sent along the path to the destination. The destination, if correct, will deliver the message according to the algorithm. Since c s is correct, it sends the message to the paths to all the correct destinations.
Therefore, the statement is true. In other words, the identity of c and the corresponding information associated with it represent the soft link c i needs to build to handle the failure of its neighbor idx.
As shown in Figure 8 , the algorithm is similar with the f-information collection algorithm, where for each c-node c i we simply look up the p-link table and the corresponding c-link tables and find whether there will be cascading failures. The main difference is that f-information collection is usually run by multiple c-nodes to collect all the cascading failures caused by a c-node c ini . In comparison, the centralized agent simply needs to look up all the c-link tables and p-link tables to analyze cascading failures due to the fact that it maintains the topology for all the nodes. We use X to represent all the cascading failures that will be caused by the crash of c ini . X is used as a buffer for the centralized agent to store the incoming requests.
In order to maintain the most up-to-date topology, the centralized agent also needs to collect information from nodes to update its routing tables. In order to detect the failures of c-nodes, each c-node still needs to monitor the correctness of its neighbors. In the presence of the failure of any of its neighbors, the c-node simply sends a message to the centralized agent. In this paper, we assume that a p-node will fail only when it loses all the control signals from the c-node. Therefore, the centralized agent does not need to collect information of {CT }.p j , and decreases the iin degree by one. This is a similar process with the distributed algorithm, where it continues until all the tables are updated.
After a c-node detects a failure, the c-node will also send a request to the agent to obtain information for the new soft links.
Discussion
The correctness of soft links is guaranteed if there are no new failures during f-information collection and link management. In large-scale and highly dependent and dynamic networks, the assumption may not be practical. In the case where new failures may occur when running the algorithms, nodes may maintain out-of-date c-link and c-group tables and cause wrong analysis results. It is also possible that the f-information algorithm halts where a node waits for an f return message but some nodes during message transmission fail. As we will discuss further in Section 5, this does not guarantee best effort broadcast such that some messages are not delivered to all the correct destinations. We can handle this problem by also using alternative routes for message delivery to increase the delivery rate and adding timers during f-information to ensure that the algorithm will end in the presence of failures.
As discussed previously, the storage complexity for each node is O(l 1 + l 1 l 2 + l 1 l 3 ) and the complexity for the number of nodes each failure detector module needs to detect is O(l 4 +l 1 l 2 +tl 3 ). In the worst case, both are limited by O(mn).
It is not hard to conclude that in the worst case, a c-node might eventually need to maintain the information of all the networks and monitor the correctness of all the c-nodes. However, in this case, it is less possible that a failure of a c-node will cause multiple cascading failures. Last but not least, our work intends to study cyber impact in interdependent networks. Therefore, we assume that no p-nodes will fail by themselves, i.e., p-nodes will only fail if they lose incoming interdependency edges. However, our algorithm can be easily extended to handle root failures caused by p-nodes.
Evaluation
We implement and evaluate our algorithm using OMNeT++ network simulation framework [42] . We construct various sizes of graphs, including both synthetic graphs and graphs constructed from real datasets. We mainly utilize synthetic graphs to test and evaluate the performance of the algorithms under extreme topologies. We also evaluate our algorithm and present a case study based on the graphs constructed from real datasets from HSIP [43] .
We compare the performance of our distributed algorithm (abbreviated as DA) with the Baseline and the Soft Link (abbreviated as SF), which are protocols that only work in an independent communication network. Baseline is a regular routing algorithm where nodes use routing tables for message transmission. SL builds soft links between nodes that are two hops away. In addition,
we also implement the centralized cascading failures analysis algorithm (abbreviated as CA) and evaluate the overhead of the algorithms and accuracy of routing information.
We limit the number of sink nodes to fewer than three and each node generates a packet by doubling the previous period (i.e., 0.01ms, 0.02ms, 0.04ms, etc.). The average delay between two neighbors is set to 0.01ms. When failure detectors are used, each node sends a heartbeat message every 0.3ms and the timer is set to 0.1ms. We set up the maximum outgoing interdependency edges for different graphs to evaluate the interdependent networks with different dependency levels. After the interdependent networks are generated, we check the validity of them by ensuring that every node has at least one incoming interdependency edge.
We first assess the network traffic according to message types to evaluate the overhead of the algorithms. We observe that the regular network traffic in SL, CA, and our proposed DA algorithm are lower than that of the Baseline.
However, the failure detection and f-information do not decrease the regular traffic to a large degree. In comparison, although the CA algorithm generates lower traffic for both failure detection and failure analysis, the regular traffic is also much lower than other algorithms. This is mainly due to the fact that all the nodes need to obtain their information through the centralized agent. Since the centralized agent generates high overhead for failure analysis and may not reply to the nodes in a timely manner, the regular traffic is then lowered for all the nodes.
We then evaluate the robustness of our distributed algorithm by measuring the packet drop rate and the average delay of failure detection. Note that we have already proved that best effort broadcast can be guaranteed if there are no new failures during f-information collection and link management. However, as discussed in Section 4.7, in a large-scale and dynamic network where failures are frequent, new failures can occur and best effort broadcast may not be guar-
anteed. Therefore, we also evaluate the packet drop rate to assess the efficiency of our algorithm. We notice that our proposed algorithm has largely reduced the packet drop rate but a longer failure detection delay is incurred. Lastly, we evaluate the f-information collection delay using various topologies. We find that due to the way we model the networks, the performance is highly impacted by the interdependency levels of the two networks. We also observe that there is no generic relationship between the number of nodes and the average latency for f-information collection. This indicates that f-information collection process does not increase the overall complexity in a scalable network.
Failure Handling Overhead
We assess the network traffic of different message types and compare our algorithm with Baseline, SL, and CA. This is used to assess the overhead caused by our algorithm for distributed failure analysis. In this experiment, we use 200 c-nodes and 200 p-nodes with maximum oin degree of 2. In the c-network, we generate a random mesh graph where the average degree is 3. Each node has 0.1 probability of being crashed. As observed in Figure 9 (a), the Baseline algorithm only has regular traffic. In comparison, since SL uses failure detector for each node to monitor the correctness of its neighbors, the regular traffic is lower than that of the Baseline. However, the traffic for failure detection is However, we notice that the regular traffic for CA is much lower than all other three algorithms. This is mainly because when the centralized agent handles concurrent requests from the c-nodes, it has to process the requests sequentially, which causes high overhead and the requests.
Compared to other three algorithms, our proposed DA algorithm generates higher volume of traffic since each node needs to monitor the correctness of a larger number of nodes. Notice that as discussed in Section 4.7, the c-nodes that a failure detector needs to monitor may not be the direct neighbors, where the correctness of the c-nodes is monitored by their neighbors. We count these notification messages also as traffic for failure detection. As shown in Figure 9 (b), the regular traffic is lower than that of both Baseline and SL but the traffic for failure detection is higher than that of SL. The f-information collection traffic is very high in the beginning. This is because all the nodes need to run finformation collection during network setup in the beginning of the experiment.
After the initialization, f-information collection is run only when failures occur. 
Robustness
In order to evaluate the performance of the algorithms under failures, we employ a chain-based topology for c-network with 50 nodes where the nodes are organized sequentially and each node is connected with at most two other nodes.
There are 50 p-nodes and the maximum oin degree is set to 2 for both c-nodes and p-nodes. We set up the sink nodes to be random nodes close to the middle of the chain. In addition, only nodes in the first half of the chain may fail. As shown in Table 2 , since the Baseline does not have a scheme to handle failures, the packet drop rate is high. This can be explained by the fact that each node becomes critical in message transmission. SL has a much lower packet drop rate because it maintains soft links between nodes that are two hops away, which are still effective when the cascading failures do not include too many consecutive failures. The CA and our proposed DA algorithm achieve the lowest packet We also evaluate the packet drop rate and the average failure detection delay with 300 c-nodes and 300 p-nodes. According to Table 2 , the packet drop rate for Baseline is similar with previous case and the packet drop rate for SL slightly increases. This is because in SL each node simply monitors the correctness of it neighbors. Although our proposed DA algorithm still achieves the lowest packet drop rate, the packet drop rate is larger than the case with fewer nodes. Also, since the topology has a larger number of nodes, the failure detection delay is also longer, especially with the nature of chain-based topology where there might be a large number of hops between any two nodes. Therefore, it is not hard to conclude that in highly interdependent and large-scale networks, the failure detection delay and packet drop rate can further be increased.
F-information Collection Delay
In order to evaluate the performance of the algorithm, we assess the average delay of f-information collection process using topologies of various network sizes with 5 to 500 c-nodes and p-nodes. We generate random mesh topologies where the average degree of c-nodes is 3. A benchmark x-y represents a graph with x cnodes, x p-nodes, and the maximum oin degree is y. Based on our observation, when the oin degree is bigger than 4, it is less possible that the failure of a c-node causes multiple failures, i.e., soft links between nodes that are two hops away are sufficient. Also, it is straightforward that if each node only has one outgoing interdependency edge, the networks become highly interdependent, where a single failure can cause the failures of almost the whole network.
We also show the depth of the tree and the average number of actual hops during f-information collection in Figure 10 (b), which might not be the same with the number of nodes in the tree since the parent node and a child node may not be direct neighbors. We notice that there is not a generic relationship between the number of nodes and the number of hops due to the way we link the nodes. We also notice that the average depth of the tree is 2 to 3 but it can gets higher in extreme cases. This indicates that a root failure of a c-node will only cause failures of some c-nodes and the failures will not cascade furthermore.
Additionally, as shown in Figure 11 , we also evaluate the average latency for f-information collection. Each f-information collection runs for 0.05 to 0.34ms, where the average latency is directly related to the number of actual hops due to the fact that our algorithm essentially visits all the nodes that will fail. This can be explained by the fact that the f-information collection visits the nodes in a DFS manner so that the delay is directly related to the number of nodes that will fail and the distance between them. 
A Case Study of Infrastructure Vulnerabilities Based on Geographical Interdependencies
In addition to providing a resilient algorithm that handles cascading failures, our algorithm also serves as a data analysis model to predict and analyze the vulnerabilities of infrastructures. We construct heterogeneous networks based on HSIP datasets [43] . We use cell towers to construct the c-network and electrical substations to construct the p-network. Although our model works specifically well for a smart grid network, it is extremely challenging, if not impossible, to obtain data for the c-network (e.g., control systems infrastructures) as they are usually proprietary. Therefore, we use cell towers for this case study to construct the network and study the interdependencies.
We utilize the geographical locations of the nodes to construct the networks. We first assess the number of c-nodes, the single failures of which will cause cascading failures for the state of Florida, which has around 900 cell towers and 1000 electrical substations. As observed in Figure 12 , the red line represents the number of nodes that can cause cascading failures. In other words, any of those c-nodes is the only node that controls one specific electrical substation.
As expected, such a number decreases dramatically as the interdependency degree increases. When the interdependency degree grows to higher than 7, the maximum number of nodes that can cause cascading failures is smaller than 20.
We also evaluate the average number of cascading failures that are caused by single c-node root failures. As observed in Figure 12 , the bar chart represents the average number. We found that the average number of cascading failures for each benchmark of interdependency degree is 3 to 4. In other words, single failures will not cause high cascading impact to the infrastructures.
Finally, we also evaluate the number of cascading failures caused by different number of root failures. In this scenario, for each experiment, we set up a number x and select x random root failures and evaluate the number of cascading failures caused by the x root failures. For each x value, we run the experiment 10 times and get the average number of cascading failures. As observed in Figure 13 , the number of cascading failures increases as the number of root failures increases. This can be easily explained by the fact that a larger number of nodes will be affected as the number of root failures increases. In addition, as the interdependency degree increases, the number of cascading failures decreases. This is also expected since by increasing the average interdependency degree, the number of cascading failures each node can cause is reduced, i.e., the resilience of the topology is increased.
To summarize, increasing interdependency degree will in general increase the resilience of the networks but it will also increase redundancy in interdependency edges. However, the number of cascading failures for each scenario will not decrease greatly. Furthermore, simply increasing interdependency degree is still not useful to guarantee message delivery during c-node crashes. This indicates that soft links are still necessary in guaranteeing message delivery.
Conclusion
In this paper, we study best effort broadcast in the interdependent networks of a multihop communication network and a power grid network. We handle crash failures through the use of soft links in the communication network. In order to efficiently build soft links to handle cascading failures, we present a fully distributed algorithm and a centralized algorithm for the nodes to analyze the failures. Each node needs to maintain minimum information in addition to an independent network, which is updated from time to time to reflect the up-to-date network topology. Based on our evaluation results, our algorithm is effective in handling cascading failures with little overhead.
